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Abstract—NASA and the Aviation Industry is looking 
into “reduced crew operations” (RCO) that would cut 
today's required two-person flight crews down to a single 
pilot with support from ground-based crews.  Shared 
responsibility across air and ground personnel will 
require highly reliable and secure data communication 
and supporting automation, which will be safety-critical 
for passenger and cargo aircraft.  This paper looks at the 
different types and degrees of authority delegation given 
from the air to the ground and the ramifications of each, 
including the safety and security hazards introduced, the 
mitigation mechanisms for these hazards, and other 
demands on an RCO system architecture which would be 
highly invasive into (almost) all safety-critical avionics. 
The adjacent fields of unmanned aerial systems and 
autonomous ground vehicles are viewed to find problems 
that RCO may face and related aviation accident 
scenarios are described.  The paper explores possible data 
communication architectures to meet stringent 
performance and information security (INFOSEC) 
requirements of RCO.  Subsequently, potential challenges 
for RCO data communication authentication, encryption 
and non-repudiation are identified.  The approach 
includes a comprehensive safety-hazard analysis of the 
RCO system to determine top level INFOSEC 
requirements for RCO and proposes an option for 
effective RCO implementation.  This paper concludes 
with questioning the economic viability of RCO in light of 
the expense of overcoming the operational safety and 
security hazards it would introduce. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
During the latter half of the past century, advances in avionics 
and related technologies have:  (1) reduced the total workload 
of aircraft flight crews and (2) allowed for the reduction of 
aircraft crew from five-person flight crews in the early 1950s 
to two-person flight crews in the 1990s.  Today, there are 
research efforts underway for “Reduced Crew Operations” 
(RCO) or “Single-Pilot Operations”.  These phrases, when 
talking about research, usually relate to FAR (Federal 
Aviation Regulations) Part 121 operations or equivalents. 
Some FAR Part 135 operations already are approved for 
single-pilot operations.  The “reduced crew operations” 
phrase can be read in one of two ways (1) reduced crew-
operations or (2) reduced-crew operations, relating 
respectively to the reduction trends of the past half-century. 
The Advanced Cockpit for Reduction of Stress and Workload 
(ACROSS) study, which is funded, in part, by the European 
Commission under its Seventh Framework Program, is 
typical of efforts in this area [1].  It includes objectives 
covering both interpretations of the “reduced crew 
operations” phrase.  Similarly, this report summarizing 
Honeywell’s research into cyber safety and security for RCO 
covers both interpretations of the “reduced crew operations” 
phrase.  However, given the increased safety and security 
issues of the latter interpretation, this research focused more 
on the latter interpretation. 
An apparently logical extension to the reduced-crew 
operations trend would be to reduce today’s two-person flight 
crew down to a single person crew.  Significant safety and 
security hazards will be introduced in the system for RCO 
when the traditional, two-pilot cockpit is transformed into 
one pilot operation with support from another person on 
ground.  Shared responsibility across on-air and on-ground 
personnel will require a highly reliable data communication 
system that offers very low latency and jitter, as well as high 
data integrity.  In addition, effective protection of the end-to-
end information system will be critical to ensure the safety of 
passengers for passenger aircraft and the survival of the 
aircraft, crew, and cargo for cargo aircraft. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20170004745 2019-08-29T22:50:48+00:00Z
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2. LEVELS OF AUTHORITY DELEGATION 
 
The types and degree of safety and security hazards 
introduced by an RCO system will depend heavily on the 
degree of authority that an airborne system relinquishes to the 
ground and any of its supporting automation.  The following 
subsections describe different degrees of this authority 
delegation and the ramifications of each, including the 
hazards introduced, the mitigation mechanisms for these 
hazards, and other demands on an RCO system architecture. 
One thing to keep in mind for these various levels of authority 
delegation is:  what does cockpit resource management 
(CRM) mean when some of the cockpit resources aren’t in 
the cockpit or anywhere near the cockpit?  Much of the 
existing RCO research has been aimed at questions like this 
that deal with the human part of potential RCO systems.  This 
report won’t revisit this previous research.  It will focus 
mainly on the safety and security aspects of hardware and 
software; it will cover only the human parts of RCO that 
haven’t been well explored in other research and are tightly 
tied with the hardware and software.  Something that falls 
into the latter category and is another thing to keep in mind 
for these various levels of authority delegation is handover 
effects during changes of authority delegation and whether 
the airborne crew (AC) or the ground crew (GC) is the pilot-
in-command.  What exactly happens when more authority is 
shifted toward the AC or toward the GC?  Is there a time 
period during the handover when neither have control of the 
aircraft?  A more detailed look at this question and related 
problems for the case of authority being unexpectedly 
returned to the AC is given in the “7. Control Hand-Back 
Problems” section below. 
In the following subsections, it should be understood that the 
terms “ground crew” and “GC” refer not only to the totality 
of the ground component of an RCO system, but also to any 
airborne automation that supports the ground crew interface. 
A possible variation for each of those authority delegation 
degrees in which the GC is in command includes the addition 
of an untrained or lesser-trained person in the cockpit who 
just carries out commands from the GC.  This does not 
represent any difference in the level of authority allocation.  
Such a variation is best viewed as a “biology-based actuator” 
for the GC. 
2.1. AC is pilot-in-command, GC is just standby redundancy 
This is the minimal level of authority delegation.  The GC 
actually has no immediate authority over the aircraft, but the 
GC has the capability of having its authority elevated to one 
of the following levels of delegation.  An issue here is how 
that elevation is performed.  For RCO operations with a 
single AC member, this elevation must be able to be 
performed after the single AC member has become 
incapacitated.  See the “Should the GC be able to take over 
for an incapacitated AC?” section below for a more detailed 
discussion of incapacitated crew considerations.  It is clear 
that some form of automation would have to be used to detect 
that the AC has become incapacitated and to elevate the GC 
authority to take over from the loss of AC capability.  This 
automated ability to detect incapacitated crew and effect the 
elevation of GC authority must be a full-time capability.  
Note that it is incorrect to assume that the dependability 
requirements for an RCO system can be reduced based on an 
argument that it is called into play only after the AC has been 
incapacitated.  Even at this lowest level of authority 
delegation, an RCO system must have the full-time capability 
of assuming authority over the aircraft.  Thus, while an RCO 
system can be argued to have lower availability requirements 
due to this argument, the integrity (commission failures) 
requirements for an RCO system are just as stringent as for 
any other full-time safety-critical aircraft system.  More 
detailed descriptions of these dependability requirements are 
given later in this report. 
2.2. AC is pilot-in-command, GC is active second pilot 
At this level of authority delegation, the GC is another “pair 
of eyes”, sharing the “see and avoid” responsibility with the 
AC.  In addition, the AC may delegate some specific sub-
duties to the GC.  Again, this calls into question the meaning 
of RCO CRM.  What are the GC’s “eyes”?   Adding multiple 
video cameras would require high-bandwidth and potentially 
safety-critical communication from the aircraft to the ground.  
There is a question of whether there will be sufficient 
available bandwidth to support this video traffic.  Papers have 
been written showing that L band communication has 
insufficient capacity and that C-band would be required.  
Given that many of the arguments for RCO envision its 
greatest use in transoceanic flight, this would mean C-band 
satellites.  However, there are no C band satellites.  And, there 
are no plans to create any C-band satellites. 
2.3. GC is pilot-in-command, AC is active second pilot 
At this level of authority delegation, the GC has immediate 
full authority over the control of aircraft.  In addition to the 
communication requirements of the previous section, the 
communication for this level of delegation has an additional 
requirement for low round-trip latency and jitter (the 
variation in latency).  This communication is also now fully 
safety-critical. 
This level of authority delegation begins to raise the AC 
recovery time issue.  This issue is the amount of time it takes 
an AC to resume control of the aircraft if GC communications 
or onboard systems fail.  During this time, neither crew is in 
control aircraft.  Again, a much more detailed discussion of 
this issue can be found in the “Control Hand-Back Problems” 
section below. 
2.4. GC is pilot-in-command, AC is just standby 
At this level of authority delegation, the AC is further “out of 
the loop”.  The AC would require more recovery time if GC 
communications or onboard systems fail.  There are varying 
degrees of the AC being “out of the loop”.   These include 
being in the cockpit:  eating, doing logbook, working on 
schedule, napping, etc. or being out of the cockpit:  lavatory, 
sleeping, checking on abnormalities, etc.  Example scenarios 
for many of these situations are given in the “Control Hand-
Back Problems” section below. 
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2.5 GC is pilot-in-command, AC is incapacitated/unavailable 
At this level of authority delegation, the GC has full authority 
over the aircraft, with the AC being incapacitated or 
otherwise unavailable to share in any cockpit duties.  
Sometimes overlooked when considering AC incapacitation 
is the fact that the AC’s incapacitation may be of a type (for 
example, seizure or dementia) that would cause them to 
perform some action(s) that are indistinguishable, at least in 
part, from the suicidal case described in the next subsection. 
2.6 GC is pilot-in-command, AC is an adversary or is suicidal 
At this level of authority delegation, the GC has full authority 
over the aircraft and has to deal with an AC that may be an 
adversary, such as a hijacker, or an authorized AC member 
that has become suicidal.  After the suicidal hijackings of 
9/11, the German wings suicide, and the potential Malaysian 
MH370 suicide, there have been calls to prevent these kinds 
of aircraft loss by creating some mechanism for the control 
of aircraft from the ground.  However, there are huge 
(probably insurmountable) problems with trying to do this.  
One of these is the fact that the system would have to prevent 
all the possible ways that an adversarial or suicidal AC could 
prevent an aircraft from safely completing its flight; and, 
there a lot of ways that this could be done.  Details of this are 
given in the section below called “RCO Interface to Onboard 
Safety-Critical Systems”.  Another problem is that any 
solution to this scenario creates a new, and probably more 
dangerous, scenario described in the next subsection. 
2.7 AC is pilot-in-command, GC is an adversary 
At this level of authority delegation, one can argue that the 
GC has been given too much authority.  If a GC can wrest 
complete control of an aircraft away from an AC, such a 
capability could be subverted by someone (inside or outside 
the system) or a component failure.  This could lead to an AC 
that wants to safely continue the aircraft’s flight, but would 
not be able to do so. 
Such a design would violate the “do thy patient no harm” 
principle by creating a new cyber-attack pathway into the 
aircraft and another source of natural failures that could 
adversely affect all safety-critical systems on an aircraft! 
 
3. RCO AUTHORITY QUESTIONS 
 
Should the GC to be able to override a “rogue” AC? 
We can group adversarial crew, suicidal crew, and crew that 
have incapacitation indistinguishable from the latter together 
into a set called “rogue pilots”.  An important design decision 
for an RCO system is to determine if that system should have 
the ability for the GC to override an AC in case the latter 
becomes a rogue pilot. 
Providing the ability for the GC to override the AC leads to a 
troubling question:  “Who has the ultimate authority, the AC 
or the GC?”  The answer to this must be the same for all 
situations.  Otherwise, who has the authority to decide what 
the situation is?  Whoever/whatever has that decision 
authority is the ultimate authority.  The decision as to 
who/what has the ultimate authority must be made at the 
RCO system design time and is fixed for the life of the design.  
This means that any RCO system design that has a solution 
for the “GC is pilot-in-command, AC is an adversary or is 
suicidal” scenario is mutually exclusive to any RCO system 
design that has a solution for the “AC is pilot-in-command, 
GC is an adversary” scenario.  There are no exceptions to this 
mutual exclusion.  One cannot design an RCO system that 
can handle both of these scenarios; it has to be one or the 
other. 
Obviously, the ultimate authority would have to be the GC if 
we want RCO to have the capability for the GC to override 
the AC.  But, why should a GC be any less prone to being 
rogue than an AC?  One can argue that there is a greater 
probability for a GC going rogue.  They don’t have to face 
certain death and they can crash more than one aircraft. 
One could envision a redundant GC.  But, each member of 
redundant GC set would have to be totally independent from 
all other members of that set, including independent 
communication channels to the aircraft. For this level of GC 
authority to be viable, the RCO system would have to 
prevent/mitigate: 
• All the possible ways that a rogue AC could make the 
flight unsafe 
• All the failure modes described in section 4 
• All the security intrusions that could have a severe safety 
impact 
Should the GC be able to take over for an incapacitated AC? 
It is highly likely that this will be required for single-person 
AC.  It is not uncommon to have an incapacitated crew 
member.  In the UK, there are 30 to 40 such incapacitations 
in a typical year (e.g., 32 in 2009 and 36 in 2004).  That is 
about one for every 10 days.  For the number of pilots in this 
pool, this gives an incapacitation probability of 
approximately 0.25% per year.  This probability is better than 
the typical requirement for passing a flight physical, which is 
that a pilot’s health should be such that there is no more than 
a 1% probability that the pilot will suffer an incapacitating 
health event within a year.  One can make a reasonable 
assumption that other airspaces have similar incapacitation 
probabilities among its pilots and the number of 
incapacitation events would be proportional to the number of 
pilots.  Of course, in determining the probability of the 
incapacitation of an AC in an RCO equipped aircraft, one 
would have to take into account the fraction of the aircraft in 
an airspace that are RCO equipped (and for design decision 
purposes, the number of aircraft that potentially would be 
RCO equipped). 
There are many ways that an incapacitation can cause, and 
has caused, an AC to inadvertently activate some control that 
is adverse to safety.  These are more than just the Hollywood 
cliché of an AC having a heart attack and falling onto the 
stick.  There’ve been a number of instances of seizures, which 
have caused limb extension; for example, doing a hard-over 
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push on the rudder pedal and then having the foot slip off the 
rudder pedal and jam it in the hard-over position.  There have 
also been instances of dementia where an aircrew member 
was unaware of what they were doing. 
Given these types of “active incapacitation”, solving the AC 
incapacitation problem is not significantly easier than the 
malicious rogue AC problem.  In fact, we can just duplicate 
the following bullet list from the above subsection: 
For this level of GC authority to be viable, the RCO system 
would have to prevent/mitigate: 
 all the possible ways that a rogue AC could make the flight 
unsafe 
 all the failure modes described in section 4 
 all the security intrusions that could have a severe safety 
impact 
Thus, we are left with the following implication chain for the 
design of an RCO system:  single person AC → tolerate 
incapacitation → assume some adversarial AC action(s)  
 
4. RCO INTERFACE TO ONBOARD SYSTEMS 
 
Murphy and Satan 
The points at which an RCO system integrates with 
traditional aircraft systems and the control paths that this 
integration needs to intercept will depend on the types and 
degree RCO authority.  A failure of a component within an 
RCO system or a successful external attack into the RCO 
system can be coupled into traditional safety-critical aircraft 
systems via this RCO integration.  These two sources of 
RCO-introduced safety hazards can be characterized as 
“Murphy and Satan” (random naturally occurring failures 
and failures induced by humans with malicious intent, 
respectively).  Protections must be provided for both and 
these protections must provide dependability commensurate 
with the highest criticality level aircraft function that it could 
adversely affect. 
When dependability requirements restrict the probability of 
failure to be less than 10-7 for a one hour exposure 
(approximately the failure probability of a single integrated 
circuit), Murphy is indistinguishable from Satan.  That is, the 
worst possible human adversary attack also could be 
produced by Murphy with help from Mother Nature, with one 
major exception.  This exception is that we assume 
independent components of a system will fail independently 
from natural sources, but humans can mount coordinated 
attacks against multiple components.  However, the RCO 
system interface into existing aircraft safety-critical systems 
is an exception to this exception.  That is, a failure of this 
interface can appear as a coordinated attack against multiple 
aircraft safety-critical systems, which had been independent 
until coupled through the RCO system interface!  Thus, the 
RCO system interface not only would have to be Level A if 
it is controlling Level A functions, it would have to be what 
is euphemistically called “Level A+”. 
Those who are not well-versed in the way that things can fail 
usually assume that failures are somewhat benign, often 
consisting only of omission failures.  But, when we get down 
to the low levels of failure probability allowed for safety-
critical aviation functions, failure modes can happen that are 
unbelievable until we find out that they actually do occur.  
Examples of these can be found in the Real System Failures 
area of the NASA DASHlink webpages [2]. 
The design of the RCO system interface into the rest of the 
aircraft safety-critical systems must be able to tolerate 
failures of commission (an integrity issue) as well as failures 
of omission (an availability issue).  The same consideration 
also must be given to the communication link from the GC to 
the aircraft.  We need to find the proper balance between 
integrity and availability.  The reason for this is that fault-
tolerance mechanisms that promote one of these 
characteristics typically is detrimental to the other.  To 
illustrate this, we can look at a simple dual-redundant 
communication link.  Two versions of this link are shown in 
figure 4-1 below, one designed for availability and the other 
designed for integrity. 
 
Figure 4-1  Availability versus Integrity 
For the highest levels of safety-criticality, in-line integrity 
mechanism such as checksums and CRCs are insufficient in 
themselves (see the FAA report DOT/FAA/TC-14/49 
“Selection of Cyclic Redundancy Code and Checksum 
Algorithms to Ensure Critical Data Integrity”, the 2005 
Dependable Systems and Networks paper “Coverage and the 
Use of CRCs in Ultra-Dependable Systems”, or the web 
pages at checksumcrc.blogspot.com).  For these dual 
communication link examples, the only fault detection 
mechanism with sufficient coverage is the comparison of the 
two messages arriving via the two independent 
communication paths.  What the receiver does with the 
messages when the messages miscompare depends if the 
system is designed for availability or integrity.  If it needs 
availability (strive to continue operation), the receiver will 
arbitrarily select one of the two messages as its input.  If it 
needs integrity (only do correct operation), it will reject both 
messages.  Thus, a dual system designed for availability will 
accept either message (an OR function) and a system 
designed for integrity needs to have both messages (an AND 
function).  Note that integrity does not imply safety.  For this 
to be the case, taking no action must be safe.  In general, it is 
not always possible to design a system that has a “failsafe” 
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state and no type of dual-redundant architecture could be 
designed that would be safe for such systems.  A simple dual 
redundancy can give you availability or integrity, but not 
both.  If both of these characteristics are needed, the system 
needs to be at least triplex. 
This availability vs. integrity observation holds for RCO 
communications from the ground to the aircraft and its 
interface into aircraft safety critical systems.  First, we need 
to determine the degree of availability and/or the degree of 
integrity needed.  With sufficient onboard automation, the 
availability requirements for communication would not be 
very stringent.  The need for this communication is 
conditional on those events with sufficiently high workload 
or for AC incapacitation.  The probability of this “on-demand 
availability” working correctly when called upon need not be 
very high if the probability of it being called upon is low 
enough.  On the other hand, the integrity requirements are not 
conditional.  The ability of the RCO system to contain 
integrity failures must be full-time.  One cannot make an on-
demand argument for RCO system integrity, similar to 
arguments that can be made for systems like autoland.  We 
cannot rely on the AC to turn off the RCO system interface 
(thus preventing integrity failures) for all times except when 
they become incapacitated.  And, then, when they are 
incapacitated turn the RCO system on.  If an RCO system is 
designed to detect AC incapacitation, then it must be on all 
the time. 
Even with just these high-level qualitative observations of 
availability and integrity requirements, we can make some 
statements about redundancy for RCO communication from 
the ground. 
For availability, simplex (no redundancy) may be sufficient, 
except for placement of redundant antennas on the aircraft to 
prevent “shadowing” of the antennas during certain 
maneuvers where parts of the aircraft may block the RF 
signal.  The final determination of whether simplex is 
sufficient will depend on the specific demands placed on the 
RCO system.  If communication redundancy is required for 
availability, each of the redundant communication paths must 
have sufficient bandwidth to carry the entire RCO 
communication demand. 
On the other hand, integrity requirements would demand at 
least dual communication redundancy, with the redundant 
paths possibly being asymmetric.  That is, one of the 
redundant paths would have to carry the entire RCO 
communication demand, but other paths could just be some 
compressed version of the entire RCO communication 
demand and the equivalent of an “enable”.  This latter 
capability would be particularly useful when using redundant 
GC.  Note that for asymmetric communication paths, the 
path(s) with lower demand possibly could be accommodated 
within existing communication equipment. 
Of course, if the system needs redundancy for both 
availability and integrity, the communication path would 
have to be triplex.  When the shadowing requirement is added 
to this, we are faced with the extreme demand of finding 
locations for six antennas on the aircraft. 
Traditional Three Layers of Aircraft Control Automation 
When looking at suitable locations for where an RCO system 
would connect into existing safety-critical onboard systems, 
one likely would begin by looking at the traditional three 
layers of aircraft control.  These can be roughly broken into: 
 Flight Management System (planning, source-to-
destination profile) 
 Auto Pilot (altitude, heading, speed) 
 Flight Control (stick and rudder – attitude control, 
stability) and Engine Control 
 
This list is in “top-down” order, in which each of the upper 
items in the list provide inputs into the next item lower down 
the list.  Providing RCO inputs into systems only near the top 
of this list requires less stringent communication latency and 
jitter requirements than for RCO inputs that are closer to the 
bottom of this post.  However, trying to take advantage of 
lower communication latency and jitter comes as a trade off 
with respect to control authority.  That is, as the RCO inputs 
intercept signals in systems toward the lower end of the above 
list, the greater the authority the RCO system has for taking 
control away from an AC that may be adversarial or 
incapacitated.  Any design for an RCO system will have to 
deal with this authority vs. latency trade-off. 
Regardless of where the RCO system interfaces into these 
existing safety-critical systems, the expected dependability 
(integrity) requirements for the RCO control will be the 
highest levied on any aircraft system. 
Other Potentially Safety-Critical Systems 
While the three layers of aircraft control described in 
previous section are the most often studied and cited locations 
for an RCO system to interface with other aircraft systems, 
there are many other controls typically used by an AC that an 
RCO system may have to control and many of them are 
safety-critical.  Here is a partial list of such controls: 
 Power 
– Conversion (AC/DC, DC/AC) and  
Distribution (tie relays and switches) 
– Circuit breakers (there are a lot of them) 
 Fuel distribution (center of gravity control, jettison) 
 Flight-control surface trim 
 Landing gear 
 Spoiler, thrust reverse, and braking systems 
 De-icing and pitot heat 
 Radio tuning and audio 
Each of the items in this list has been implicated as a 
contributing factor to incidents in which their misuse has led 
to a catastrophic event.  Thus, it should be clear that an RCO 
system must be able to control all of these.  However, these 
levels of pervasiveness and invasiveness of the RCO 
interface have not been adequately addressed by previous 
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RCO and SPO studies (for Part 121) which typically have 
concentrated on the traditional three levels of aircraft control. 
5. RCO AIRBORNE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
Depending on the requirements for handling rogue pilots, an 
RCO system may need to intercept all signals/systems that 
could possibly cause an aircraft to not continue safe flight 
(including systems not in the three traditional control layers 
of FMS, autopilot, and flight control).  Even without a rogue 
pilot (i.e., just “benign” loss of AC) many signals/systems 
will need to be intercepted to provide a ground override.   A 
couple of possible on-aircraft RCO system architectures are 
shown in the figures below.  Both are expensive, safety-
critical, and highly disruptive to many current aircraft 
systems.  These characteristics are unavoidable; they would 
be true of any RCO airborne system architecture. 
 
Figure 5-1 Centralized “Porcupine” 
 
Figure 5-2 Remote Agents 
In the “Porcupine” architecture shown in Figure 5-1, 
individual signals go out from the RCO interface boxes that 
provide the GC ground override capability to all the points in 
all the other subsystems where the RCO must intercept some 
existing signal.  The name “Porcupine” comes from the fact 
that there might not be enough surface area on the Ground 
Override boxes to accommodate all the possible signal lines. 
In the Remote Agents architecture shown in Figure 5-2, the 
mass of Porcupine wires are replaced by a new high-
dependability network that connects the Ground Override 
boxes to remote agents within each of the other aircraft 
subsystems.  The only difference between this Remote 
Agents architecture and the Porcupine architecture is the 
structure of the signal interconnects. 
The Ground Override boxes are shown as triplex.  This is 
because many of the places where the other subsystems must 
be intercepted have no always-safe state.  Therefore, a dual-
redundant control is insufficient.  One example of this is the 
landing gear.  The gear must be up for high-speed flight and 
down for landing.  Neither state (up/down) is safe in the other 
situation.  It should be clear that many of the other safety-
critical controls have no universally-safe state. 
One set of safety-critical controls might not be so obviously 
lacking of universally-safe states, but actually is likely to be 
the set of controls which will make it prohibitively expensive 
to retrofit an RCO system into an existing aircraft.  This set 
of controls is the circuit breakers.  There are a lot of them.  If 
some downstream electrical malfunction could cause a fire, 
the safe state for the circuit breaker is off.  This is the main 
reason that circuit breakers exist.  On the other hand, there 
are a number of electronic/electrical subsystems on the 
aircraft for which the safe state is having one or more circuit 
breakers on.  So, dual redundancy isn’t enough.  And, it’s not 
feasible to make circuit breakers, switches, and relays fail-
operational (providing availability and integrity, 
simultaneously) using triplex.  The common way of 
providing fail-operational capability in circuit breakers, 
switches, and relays is the quad configuration shown below. 
 
 
 
Figure Error! No text of specified style in document.Quad 
Circuit Breaker, Switch, or Relay 
This configuration is single fault tolerant to any single stuck-
closed or stuck-open component.  But, this configuration 
presents the problem of how to connect a triplex controller to 
these quad components.  The easiest solution is to make the 
controller quad instead of triplex.  Then, each member of the 
quad controller would independently control one component 
of the quad circuit breaker.  In the Porcupine architecture, the 
Ground Override boxes would have to be quad and there 
would have to be four independent control signals from these 
boxes to each of the quad circuit breakers.  In the Remote 
Agents architecture, the agents would have to be quad and 
have a triplex-to-quad conversion voting plane between it and 
the triplex dependable network, or the entire system would 
have to be quad. 
In addition, it is quite likely that many of these intercept 
points will need to have their actions coordinated.  As soon 
as any type of coordination is required among redundant 
elements, the possibility of a Byzantine fault is created [3].  
To tolerate one Byzantine fault, a minimum of four fault sets 
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is needed [4]  Thus, the Ground Override boxes may need to 
be quad to cover these faults. 
6. RELATED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
Previous RCO and SPO R&D 
While safety, security, and certification issues for the 
hardware and software that make up the nonhuman parts of 
an RCO or SPO system haven’t been totally neglected in 
previous studies, these issues certainly have taken a backseat 
to studying the human parts of these systems.  This could be 
an example of “design procrastination” where the difficult 
and uninteresting parts of a design problem are delayed to the 
end of the process.  What little publication has been created 
for these areas of RCO and SPO was consulted for this effort. 
To “not reinvent the wheel” and “not look under rocks that 
have already been examined before”, previous R&D in fields 
adjacent to RCO and SPO were also examined.  The two most 
applicable adjacent fields are unmanned aerial systems 
(UASs) and autonomous ground vehicles.  Both of these 
areas are currently hotbeds of R&D activity looking at some 
issues that could be applicable to RCO. 
R&D Done In Adjacent Fields 
 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 
While unmanned aerial systems have some issues with 
availability, safety, and security for remote control of aircraft, 
there is no AC to share control responsibility and the 
dependability requirements are much less stringent than for 
civil transport operations.  A few pieces of information from 
this field are incorporated in subsequent sections of this 
report. 
 (Semi-)Autonomous Ground Vehicles 
While ground vehicles don’t fly (yet), and they aren’t 
remotely controlled (yet), and their dependability 
requirements are much less stringent than for aircraft (largely 
because crashes of ground vehicles don’t cause potential 
drivers and passengers to avoid these vehicles as much as an 
aircraft crash causes potential passengers to avoid flying), the 
recent research and development into (semi-)autonomously 
driven ground vehicles covers an important aspect of RCO 
system design not present in unmanned aerial systems.  This 
aspect is the large degree of control authority that an in-
vehicle person relinquishes to automation and/or remote 
persons.  This degree of control authority delegation is much 
larger than previous systems (e.g., aircraft autopilots and 
ground vehicle adaptive cruise control).  In fact, we are now 
looking at situations where the automation/remote control 
authority supersedes that of the in-vehicle person and that 
person may not even have the ability to take back some 
portion of that control. 
One of the hot topics in (semi-)autonomously driven ground 
vehicle R&D is the issue of full autonomy versus shared 
responsibility.  Ford says that the possible interim step to 
fully autonomous vehicles, where the driving responsibility 
is shared between an autonomous digital driving system and 
human drivers, can’t be done safely.  The problem is the 
handoff from the digital system back to the human driver 
when something unexpected happens.  Designers can’t 
anticipate every possible situation a vehicle can encounter. 
“Right now, there’s no good answer, which is why we’re 
kind of avoiding that space.” — Dr. Ken Washington,                                         
Ford’s VP of research and advanced engineering 
This problem of control being handed back to a human when 
automation fails is already an emerging problem for cockpit 
automation systems.  Introduction of RCO and/or SPO will 
exacerbate this problem. 
7. CONTROL HAND-BACK PROBLEMS 
NASA’s Paul Schutte, in his paper “How to Make the Most 
of Your Human: Design Considerations for Single Pilot 
Operations”12 has the following discourse on “Is Automation 
the Hero?” 
• One reason why computers are so reliable at what they are 
programmed to do is because they give up at the first sign 
of trouble. 
• When the autopilot reaches its maximum authority, it 
throws up its hands and tosses control back to the human, 
whether the human is ready for it or not.  
• Pilots routinely must intervene whether it’s simply 
resetting a circuit breaker or turning off the automation. 
• The main reason why humans are still on the flight deck 
is to manage risk by dealing with or avoiding the 
unexpected, unanticipated, or complex situations 
The same things can be said about the RCO communication 
path from a GC to the aircraft, the path into the aircraft’s 
safety-critical systems, and any of its onboard supporting 
automation.  The issue is that there may be nobody/nothing 
in control of the aircraft between the time that the 
communication or automation fails and the time that the AC 
can retake control of the aircraft.  The duration of this time 
depends on how “out of the loop” AC is at the time of the 
failure.  The following subsections describe these varying 
degrees of being “out of the loop” and include illustrative 
events from actual aviation incidents and accidents. 
Time needed to get to the controls, when out of the cockpit 
On a commuter flight, the captain got stuck in the lavatory 
due to the door latch being broken.  This flight had only one 
cabin crew member, who had to go into the cockpit when the 
captain left it.  The captain yelled for a passenger to tell the 
cockpit what was going on.  The passenger banged on the 
cockpit door and yelled through it trying to explain the 
situation.  The problem with this was he had a thick Middle 
East accent.  The people in the cockpit weren’t going to open 
the door under those circumstances.  The captain had to 
breakdown the lavatory door.  The flight continued on 
without further incident after the AC rescinded their radio 
message that they were potentially in a hijack situation. 
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A common reason for leaving the cockpit is to investigate an 
abnormal situation (e.g., smoke).  One can argue this is 
precisely the wrong time to leave the cockpit unattended.  The 
abnormality being investigated could be something that 
would cause the loss of RCO communication or its interface 
to critical systems.  For example, a half-hour into a scheduled 
12-hour flight from SEA to PEK, a cockpit crew member 
rushed to the rear of the airplane to investigate the smell of 
smoke, which is never a good sign.  On an RCO flight, this 
would have been the entire crew (!), away from the cockpit 
for a significant amount of time.  The airplane returned to 
Seattle (see Figure 7-1) for over-night repairs, which replaced 
a cabin air recirculation fan and one third of the cabin seats. 
So, this had to be a nontrivial fire.  Such events are not 
uncommon.  Some have said [5] that SPO would require 
automation that has no hand-back mode (no auto-pilot trip) if 
the crew has to leave the cockpit. 
 
Figure 7-1 Fire trucks surround an aircraft at SEA 
Time needed to get to the controls, when in the cockpit  
The first corollary of Murphy’s Law is:  When things do go 
wrong, they will go wrong at the most inopportune time.  On 
an Aeroflot Flight 593 (an A310), the captain allowed his two 
children to sit in the front two cockpit seats.  The son 
accidently disengaged the autopilot lateral control.  While 
there were two members of the cockpit crew in the cockpit, 
having the children in the way plus the g-forces caused by the 
lack of the autopilot lateral control prevented crew getting 
back into their seats and at the controls in time.  All 63 
passengers and 12 crew members died in the crash. 
Once at the controls, time needed to regain situational 
awareness under normal conditions 
In the Air Canada’s Incident Report [6] on Air Canada Flight 
878 (a B767) had the following to say:  “Under the effects of 
significant sleep inertia (when performance and situational 
awareness are degraded immediately after waking up)” a 
pilot mistook the planet Venus as lights of another airplane 
on a collision course and he dove to avoid it.  While this 
maneuver managed to avoid a collision with the planet, 14 
passengers and two crew members were injured because they 
were not wearing seatbelts. 
The cognitive delay due to the “startle effect” is present even 
when the crew is fully awake. 
Audi says its tests show it takes an average of 3 to 7 seconds, 
and as long as 10, for a driver to snap to attention and take 
control, even with flashing lights and verbal warnings. 
“…anyone who gets behind the wheel [of a semi-autonomous 
car] must be properly trained.  For Audi, this means learning 
to be a better than average driver…if you need to grab the 
wheel, the odds are something’s gone terribly amiss” [7]. 
The Air France Flight 447 crash is now well known.  It was 
a scheduled passenger flight from Rio de Janeiro to Paris, 
which crashed in 2009.  The Airbus A330 entered an 
aerodynamic stall from which it did not recover and crashed 
into the Atlantic Ocean, killing all 228 persons aboard the 
aircraft.  When the airspeed indicators failed, the autopilot 
sounded the caution alarm (startle effect) and threw the 
control immediately to pilots (who were unprepared). 
Another crash in which the startle effect was cited as a 
significant contributing factor was Colgan Air Flight 3407, 
marketed as Continental Connection under a codeshare 
agreement with Continental Airlines.  It was a scheduled 
passenger flight from Newark, NJ, to Buffalo, NY, which 
crashed in 2009. The Bombardier Dash-8 Q400 aircraft 
entered an aerodynamic stall from which it did not recover 
and crashed into a house in Clarence Center, NY, killing all 
49 passengers and crew on board, as well as one person inside 
the house. 
Recovery time can be even longer if diagnosis is required 
The crew of Qantas Flight 32, in which an A380 engine 
disintegrated [8], needed 50 minutes to sort out all the 
ECAM warning messages (the crew had no time for ACARS) 
and assess the aircraft damage.  It was lucky that this flight 
had five cockpit crew members (three normal crew plus a 
Check Captain and a Supervising Check Captain).  So, they 
had the luxury of having an extra person they could send aft 
to look out the windows and assess damage.  Dealing with 
abnormal situations may require additional AC, versus a 
reduction in crew.  Richard Woodward (a Qantas A380 pilot 
and deputy president of the Australian and International 
Pilots Association) said that the “number of failures is 
unprecedented […] There is probably a one in 100 million 
chance to have all that go wrong” [9].  But, there have been 
over a half-dozen previous similar incidents.  The Sioux City 
DC-10 crash is well known.  Again, they were lucky to have 
additional crew on board, which prevented the crash from 
being worse than it was. 
8. ARE COMMUNICATION THREATS REAL? 
When a capability is created to remotely control an aircraft, 
the security of the communication used for this control is an 
obvious concern.  But, would someone really try to interfere 
with the flight of an RCO aircraft or is this just a 
“Hollywood” fantasy?  It turns out that the answer is:  “Just 
because you’re paranoid, that doesn’t mean that they are not 
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out to get you.”  We have to assume there will be bad actors 
that are out to get us because there have been a number of 
instances in the past where radio communications to aircraft 
have been attacked.  Some of these instances are described 
below in subsections grouped by the type of perpetrators. 
Individuals 
Officially called a “phantom controller” (a.k.a., “bogus”, 
“fake”, or “phony” controller), there are individuals who like 
to pretend that they are air-traffic controllers.  In the UK, 
there were 18 in 1999.  The U.S. will only say that it happens 
“several times a year”.  It has been said that these instances 
have been underreported in order to prevent copycats.  This 
is hard to verify, but from reasonable sources.  Jim Epik has 
written a book on the subject, called “Phantom Controller”.  
He also has created a petition to encrypt ATC 
communications. 
Ad Hoc / Transitory Groups 
During the 1981 PATCO strike, some of the striking 
members became phantom controllers. 
Opposing factions in civil wars would like to wrest control of 
the airspace over their contested country from others 
involved in the war.  And thus, they will interfere with the 
other factions’ communication with aircraft. 
Nation-State Sponsored 
An Air France captain said that his aircraft received bogus 
air-traffic control instructions during a flight back to France 
from Japan.  He believed that his aircraft was targeted 
because he had transmitted a PAN PAN message indicating 
that an electrical problem had caused half of his cockpit 
avionics to be inoperative and the crew would be under a 
heavy workload.  The attacker (indications were that it was 
North Korea) made six attempts to cause the aircraft to fly 
into an unsafe situation.  The captain suggested that 
encrypting the PAN PAN message for secrecy may have 
prevented this attack. 
9. COMMUNICATION ENCRYPTION 
The only really viable current method to protect aircraft 
communications is the use of encryption.  However, there are 
a number of problems to overcome when employing 
encryption to protect RCO communications.  These problems 
include each nation’s laws governing cryptography, the 
latency introduced by encryption, and other ways that current 
encryption algorithms are ill suited for use in real-time cyber-
physical systems. 
(Inter)National Cryptography Laws  
There are laws in almost every country that place some form 
of restriction on the export, the import, and/or the domestic 
use of encryption technology.  These laws may prohibit the 
use, limit the use, and/or require licensing for the use of 
encryption within its territories. 
Underlying the use of encryption is a cryptographic key 
management infrastructure.  There are two aspects to key 
management, trust and logistics. 
Trust involves three questions: 
1. Who do you trust? 
2. With what? 
3. To do what? 
For example: 
1. Can an airline trust the U.S. government? 
2. With its cryptographic keys? 
3. Not to reveal these keys (to North Korea, UK, Israel?) 
Note that specifics are important.  In the last element of the 
example, some airlines might view the U.S. revealing 
cryptographic keys to Israel as trustworthy; where as other 
airlines would consider that to be untrustworthy.  Most 
airlines would expect that the U.S. would not reveal its 
cryptographic keys to North Korea. 
Key management logistics are the mechanisms to enforce the 
trust.  This includes the creation of keys with their ownership 
association, key distribution, and revocations.  Key 
management allows only authorized users to have possession 
of private or secret keys, often only for a set period of time.  
These cryptographic keys can have an ordinary use (e.g., 
RCO communications) and an extraordinary use (e.g., a 
government investigation). 
The laws governing cryptography in many countries require 
that some arm of the country’s government have access to the 
“plaintext” that has been encrypted.  The cryptographic 
literature uses the term “plaintext” to mean anything that will 
be encrypted or has been decrypted and the term “ciphertext” 
is used to mean the equivalent of the plaintext after it has been 
encrypted but before it has been decrypted. 
Usually, the easiest way to give a government access to the 
plaintext is to allow them access to the cryptographic keys 
used for the encryption.  This will allow the government to 
decrypt the cipher-text.  But, this still can complicate the key 
management infrastructure. 
Much of the literature covering future encryption systems for 
aircraft communications assumes that just saying an X.509-
based public key infrastructure (PKI) will be used for key 
management is a sufficient explanation for how the key 
management problems will be solved.  But, full PKI is heavy 
weight and doesn’t solve all the problems by itself. 
PKI doesn’t answer the trust questions.  The trust questions 
include the question of whose keys will be used for a 
particular flight.  As a complex example to illustrate the 
point, let’s say that an aircraft manufacturer includes some 
cryptographic equipment manufactured by some avionics 
supplier; the aircraft manufacturer sells the aircraft to a 
leasing company; the leasing company leases the aircraft to a 
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scheduled airline; the airline rents the aircraft to a charter 
company at times when the airline isn’t using that aircraft; 
and, the charter company hires a crew that normally works 
for some other rival airline.  Whose keys should be used for 
the encryption?  Should the cryptographic equipment have 
software with a dedicated link to some key management 
infrastructure owned by the avionics company?  the aircraft 
manufacturer?  the leasing company?  the airline?  Or, should 
the crew load keys as part of preflight?  If so, what keys 
should be used?  the charter airline’s keys?  the crew’s 
personal keys?  the keys they use as employees of the rival 
airline?  Should there be one set of keys for all systems on the 
aircraft that want to communicate with the ground?  Or, 
should some systems have keys (or use a key infrastructure) 
that is different from other systems?  For example, the 
manufacturer of engines that are leased in a “power by the 
hour” arrangement might like to have engine performance 
data transmitted to them using their own key.  Should the 
keys used for RCO communication be the same as used for 
CPDLC? 
Encryption can be used to provide secrecy and/or 
authentication.  These two properties don’t need to be tied 
together.  Often glossed over in discussions of key 
management is the fact that key distribution needs secrecy 
protection for private and secret keys, even if these keys are 
only used for authentication (not secrecy).  Popular 
authentication schemes need private keys (for public-key 
system signatures) or secret keys (for message authentication 
codes).  The need for secrecy in the distribution of these keys 
complicates the key management infrastructure and can 
cause problems with national laws that restrict encryption 
used for secrecy, when an encrypted channel is used to 
provide secrecy for key distribution rather than using 
physically secure communication path for the key 
distribution. 
There are current uses of PKI for aircraft communication.  
However, it is unknown whether this PKI can be used for 
RCO communication. 
During the course of this study, an invention was created to 
mitigate some of the issues for key management logistics and 
potential legal problems for aircraft communication 
encryption.   
Encryption Latency 
One problem encountered by UAS operations is 
communication latency.  The sum of the communication 
latencies can be on the order of a couple seconds, which can 
make closed-loop remote control of an aircraft difficult.  
Encryption of this communication can be an aggregating 
actor in these latencies.  The communication for each 
iteration around the closed loop incurs the latency of two 
encrypts and two decrypts (the four arrows in Figure 9-1). 
If AES (or similar block cipher) is used to provide secrecy 
and integrity, a block (e.g., 128 bits) of store-and-forward 
latency has to be added, plus the latency for any added 
initialization vector (IV) and/or integrity data (e.g., 32 bits 
each).  These latencies depend on communication speed (the 
slower the link, the longer these latencies) and they have to 
be added to the cryptographic computation latencies.  The 
sum of these latencies doubles if handshakes (e.g. 
ACK/NAK) are used and are encrypted. 
UASs try to mitigate this cryptographic latency problem by 
using very high-speed (e.g., 10 Gbps) communication links 
and special hardware encryption (e.g., KG-340 encryptors 
and Single-Chip Crypto field programmable gate arrays).  It 
is unlikely that RCO communications can find such a wide 
bandwidth for its use and adding additional high-speed 
encryption hardware can be expensive. 
Problems with general-purpose cryptography in cyber-
physical systems 
An RCO system is an example of a cyber-physical system 
with real-time and other constraints not seen in general-
purpose processing.  While latency and jitter may be the main 
differences in requirements/constraints between general-
purpose processing and cyber-physical system processing, 
there are a number of other problems with employing 
general-purpose cryptographic algorithms in cyber-physical 
systems.  Many of these problems compound the latency and 
jitter problems. 
The remainder of this subsection deals with symmetric 
encryption algorithms implemented in software, possibly 
with hardware support in the form of instructions in the 
processor’s instruction set architecture (ISA) or an adjunct 
crypto field programmable gate array.  The temporal 
performance of asymmetric (public key) algorithms is not 
critical for RCO communications.  This is because the use 
asymmetric cryptography can be restricted to the exchange of 
keys that will be used in symmetric encryption algorithms to 
achieve secrecy, continuing authentication, and/or integrity 
(via message authentication codes); and, the key exchange 
can be perform during pre-flight or at other times when 
temporal performance is not important.  Also not discussed 
are stand-alone encryption “boxes”, because their added costs 
in terms of cash outlay, size, weight, power, and latency 
makes them less desirable. 
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Figure 9-1 Encryption Latency 
One of the problems with employing general-purpose 
cryptographic algorithms in cyber-physical systems is the 
slow startup for each key change.  The startup delay is due to 
“key scheduling” being done.  Key scheduling is the 
conversion of the cryptographic key into data that the 
encryption algorithm uses internally.  When the encryption is 
not used for real-time cyber-physical systems, it makes sense 
for key scheduling to be made expensive.  The rationale is 
that legitimate users incur these startup delay costs a 
relatively small number of times.  On the other hand, an 
attacker that uses some form of brute force key-related search 
would have to try a huge number of different keys and incur 
the startup delay cost a vastly greater number of times.  This 
is one of the reasons why general-purpose cryptographic 
algorithms have been designed with key scheduling that is 
slow.  Another reason that general-purpose cryptographic 
algorithm key scheduling is slow is that they have been 
optimized for peak throughput performance, which is usually 
measured in clock-cycles-per-byte.  In the “my algorithm is 
faster than your algorithm” speed propaganda wars, startup 
doesn’t count.  Therefore, to game the system, algorithm 
designers can put more work into the startup to make the rest 
of the algorithm run faster. 
As another point of comparison, communications in cyber-
physical systems typically use smaller messages and sessions 
than communications in general-purpose systems.  This 
means that cyber-physical system communications have less 
data over which to amortize startup costs. 
With the cryptography speed propaganda focused on peak 
throughput, average throughput and worst-case throughput 
are ignored.  However, in cyber-physical systems, typically 
only the worst case timing counts, average is unimportant and 
peak is even less important.  A missed real-time deadline 
cannot be helped by finishing early at other times.  For cyber-
physical systems, latency and jitter are both usually more 
important than throughput.  Often, jitter is more important 
than latency because control algorithms can better deal with 
a known latency rather than with instances of unknown jitter. 
All known general-purpose crypto algorithms need to store 
some data in memory while they’re executing.  Cyber-
physical software generally makes heavy use of multitasking 
with many context switches per second that can cause each 
task’s cache entries to be evicted (replaced with some other 
task’s data).  To guarantee timing performance, one must 
assume that most memory accesses will cause cache misses.  
But, existing crypto performance propaganda assumes a “pre-
warmed” cache.  That is, timing performance measurements 
are done only after making sure that all the data the algorithm 
possibly could use are in the cache.  Not only does the 
dependence on cached data adversely affect temporal 
performance, it also can be (as has been) a path that leaks 
information that can be used to “break” the encryption.  Even 
if all needed data are in the L1 cache, cache hits can be 
expensive (equivalent to about a half-dozen instructions in an 
Intel i7 processor).  The only solution to these cache problems 
is to not use cache, which means not using any data during 
the execution of an algorithm that does reside totally with the 
register set of the processor. 
A cryptographic algorithm characteristic closely related to 
low-latency is “key agility”.  This is the ability of an 
algorithm to easily and quickly change from one key to 
another.  There are two types of key agility:  the first is the 
ability to switch to a new key and/or a key with a new IV that 
hasn’t undergone any key scheduling, the second is the ability 
to switch to a key and IV pair that has undergone any required 
key scheduling.  Of course, the former requires that key 
scheduling be done and algorithms needing good key agility 
must minimize the time and effort required to do key 
scheduling.  The second type of key agility depends on the 
amount of data that the algorithm must use during its 
execution, therefore, algorithms needing good key agility 
should minimize the amount of data it needs while executing.  
For avionics in general, good key agility may be required if 
different subsystems and/or applications within the aircraft 
need different keys and there is a centralized provider of 
encryption services for these subsystems and/or applications.  
Good key agility also may be required as an aircraft crosses 
boundaries that delineate jurisdictions where different keys 
must be used and the keys must be quickly changed at the 
boundary in order to avoid a communication “dead zone” 
where encrypted communication can’t be performed. 
General-purpose crypto algorithms increase the sizes of the 
messages they encrypt.  This increase can include data 
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needed as an IV, padding, and integrity check data.  This need 
is amplified by the small sizes of many cyber-physical system 
messages, where even small per-message overhead due to 
cryptography can be a large burden.  This may require more 
communication bandwidth than is available.  A design goal 
for a real-time cyber-physical cryptographic algorithm is to 
minimize or eliminate message expansion.  This requirement 
eliminates the use of those block cipher modes that round 
messages up to the next block size. 
In order to provide the properties of continuing 
authentication, secrecy, and integrity, most existing 
cryptographic systems use separate secrecy and integrity 
algorithms or use an added integrity mode that is wrapped 
around a secrecy algorithm.  Compared to an authenticating 
encryption (AE) (a.k.a., integrity-aware) algorithm, which 
intrinsically provides continuing authentication and integrity 
along with secrecy, these approaches exacerbate the 
problems discussed here. 
These are the reasons, we created an AE algorithm (called 
BeepBeep) specifically for real-time cyber-physical and/or 
retro-fit applications.  This algorithm was created in 1999 and 
published in 2002 [10].  It has a low code size, zero working 
data memory, low latency, good key agility, and provides 
continuing authentication, secrecy, and integrity in a single 
pass.  In the last couple of decades, there have been several 
competitions and initiatives to create new encryption 
algorithms, e.g. AES [11], CRYPTREC [12], eSTREAM 
[13], and NESSIE [14].  But, none of them had explicitly 
stated goals that addressed the problems discussed here. 
10. SUMMARY 
The RCO concept does not seem to be economically viable 
for Part 121 operations, at least in the short term where 
existing aircraft would have to be retrofitted for RCO 
capability.  This follows from the observation that:  single 
person AC → tolerate incapacitation → assume some 
adversarial AC action(s) … and, the very high cost of 
implementing an RCO system that can safely and securely 
provide the capability of controlling an aircraft in which some 
actions by an incapacitated crew could be similar to that of 
an adversary. 
The cost calculus assumes that the AC to be replaced will be 
a First Officer, costing a typical salary of just over $100,000 
a year plus benefits.  However, 100% of that cost cannot be 
eliminated.  There must be some GC costs.  If there is a 1:1 
replacement of AC with GC, obviously, there is no labor cost 
savings.  There have been estimates that a GC can handle five 
aircraft simultaneously.  But, that must be for benign 
conditions and the GC intercepting the aircraft systems at the 
FMS level (possibly, the Autopilot level).  If the GC has to 
intercept the aircraft systems at the Flight Control level 
(required for adversarial or incapacitated AC), it is hard to 
imagine that the aircraft:GC ratio can be better than 1:1.  This 
suggests that an RCO system installation on an aircraft must 
have interception points at the lowest level (for full control) 
and at a higher level (to ease latency constraints, reduce the 
number of crew actions that need to be taken, and allow a 
greater aircraft:GC ratio).  A potential GC structure would be 
to have the number of GC be:  number-of-aircraft-to-be-
controlled / 5 + 1.  This assumes that no more than one 
aircraft within the set of aircraft to be controlled would need 
continuous control at the Flight Control level at any point in 
time.  If a GC center is designed to control 20 aircraft 
simultaneously, the GC complement would have to be 20/5 + 
1 = 5.  To this number, we need to add another GC to allow 
for breaks.  This ignores any additional personnel needed to 
protect against adversarial GC.  With 6 GC under RCO 
replacing 20 AC First Officers under today’s two person 
ACs, this is a reduction of crew cost of $70,000 plus 70% of 
benefits per year per aircraft. 
The cost of completely redesigning and replacing most of the 
cockpit avionics and adding a quad-redundant (or better) 
Ground Override system, that has tentacles into many 
locations within most of these systems (many of which will 
also have to be at last quad redundant), will be more than the 
cost for original avionics and will have fewer aircraft over 
which to spread the development cost.  This development 
cost also will be higher than the original development cost 
due to the Ground Override system needing to be, 
euphemistically, “Level A+” because of its potential to be a 
single point of failure for all of the critical avionics.   In 
addition to these aircraft costs, we must add the development, 
deployment, and operation cost for the ground segment.  
These “ground” costs could be very large when they include 
the development, deployment, and operation costs of a C-
band satellite system.  The amortization of all these large 
costs (including time value of money) must be less than the 
crew labor cost saved. 
It should be noted that some sources believe that RCO/SPO 
may have some cost benefit.  For example, the account of Dr. 
R. Mike Norman’s presentation at NASA’s Single-Pilot 
Operations Technical Interchange Meeting [15] includes:  
“SPO may have economic benefit, but once again, new costs 
associated with SPO were not addressed”.  The latter half of 
this quote indicates that the magnitude of the cost to provide 
coverage for the safety and security problems identified in 
this report were not accounted for in this assessment. 
The inclusion of RCO within future aircraft designs would 
cost less than for retrofit.  There are two reasons for this.  The 
first is that some avionics developments will make it easier to 
add RCO functionality, just as a byproduct of their creation 
for other reasons.  A good example of this is the replacement 
of individual circuit breakers with an integrated “electronic 
fuse box”.   This will make it a lot easier for an RCO Ground 
Override interface to control the equivalent of circuit 
breakers.  The second reason is that future avionics can 
anticipate the possible addition of RCO.  However, the degree 
to which creators of avionics would be willing to add “hooks” 
for an RCO option is unknown, given that these “hooks” 
would add some cost for all same-type aircraft, including 
aircraft that don’t use RCO.  It is unclear if the reduced cost 
for RCO in future aircraft would make RCO economically 
viable. 
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